The U.S. nuclear deterrent for several decades has been a three-pointed spear—land-based Minuteman Missiles in hardened silos, Trident II missiles on board Ohio class submarines, and a wide range of bombs dropped from long range bombers, such as the Boeing B-52 or the Northrup Grumman B-2. Cruise missiles launched from either ships or aircraft can also be nuclear tipped, but are considered more tactical than strategic and generally not thought of as nuclear deterrent weapons. The Minuteman III currently in service is expected to be replaced by the end of this decade by the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent missile system recently approved by Congress.
The Argument in Favor of Upgrading the Current Land-based Arsenal: A debate arises as to why we should update an expensive ground missile system when our ships and planes could provide just as good a deterrent. The argument in favor of the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) is that the land-based missiles can be launched quicker in the event of emergencies. Submerged submarines are harder to communicate with, and bombers take time to reach their targets and must penetrate enemy anti-aircraft defenses. The B-52’s themselves are old (first developed 66 years ago) and slow (top speed less than 600 mph) making them more maintenance intensive and subject to interception by enemy air defenses. Further, new technological breakthroughs might jeopardize submarines or aircraft, but it’s unlikely that technology will make destroying a hardened land-based missile silo any easier. Another point is that the hardened silos will currently require several warheads by an enemy to destroy, consuming an inordinate number of warheads where the supply is restricted by treaty. Moreover, land-based missiles can be launched when enemy missiles are approaching. Without the hardened silos an enemy could devastate our nuclear arsenal by destroying only five targets—three bomber air fields and two submarine bases.
The Argument Against Upgrading the Current Land-based Arsenal: The argument against land-based missiles is that the over-consumption of Russian warheads onto hardened silos is predicated upon a Russian first strike. Military researchers believe that Russia could be decapacitated strictly by bombers and submarines. Additionally, land-based missiles launched at Asian targets would have to pass over Russian air space possibly triggering an unintended response from Russia. Further, an upgraded land-based missile system would enhance the U.S.’s ability to launch a first strike at any enemy potentially inviting a nuclear disaster, especially since enemies and rivals would be required to keep up with their own first strike capabilities.
The Leading Political Position: Politically speaking the nuclear defense triad is popular with politicians in midwestern states where the land-based missiles are located. Congress has agreed to pay for GBSD, and the new administration’s defense secretary, Lloyd Austin, is in favor of it. Because of its popularity with the military, the nuclear triad will likely be left alone by President Biden. However, politicians in particularly the Democratic Party are loudly complaining about the money spent to maintain the system and apply new technologies.
Disclosure of Usage: Another debate besides the number and constituency of the nuclear arsenal is the question of their usage. For the most part, our government and military will not disclose whether or not usage of nuclear weapons is on or off the table when a military confrontation arises. Further, they won’t disclose which warships or warplanes at various stations around the world are nuclear armed. But if the sole purpose of the nuclear arsenal is to deter a nuclear attack on the U.S. homeland or territory, then should the government publicly declare that nuclear weapons would not be used first in any other confrontation, even those involving massive armed forces and/or biological weapons? The idea behind a “No First Use” policy currently under consideration would be that the U.S. would preclude the usage of nuclear weapons to thwart an enemy’s pending nuclear assault. Such a political stance would then make mandatory the maintenance of hardened silos with land-based missiles to render a “mutual self-destruction” retaliatory launch.
Conclusions: Government expenses not withstanding I believe we should maintain the status quo with our missile deterrents. Why? We naturally dread the thought of a nuclear holocaust, but history has shown that without nuclear weapons at all, there is a greater danger of widespread conventional war. If there were no nukes, would this world erupt into another conventional war of attrition like we’ve seen in WWI and WWII? In the 1980’s British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher once said to the effect that we don’t give the nuclear bomb enough credit, meaning its deterrent effect is worth the cost. On a similar note, the threat of nuclear imbalances has caused the U.S. and Russia to do some of the most serious negotiations of the entire bilateral relationship between the two countries. The idea that we could defeat a Russian nuclear attack with just our bombers and submarines may or may not bear out, but I say, why take a chance? The concept an enemy could obliterate our nuclear arsenal by destroying only five targets should be remembered in context with the bombing of Pearl Harbor in December, 1941, where our Pacific naval battle fleet was devastated in just a few hours.
As for the question of disclosing the usage of nuclear weapons, I believe the best approach is the current one where we don’t say if we will use them or not, and we won’t say whether any ships or planes carry them or not. That should keep the plotters against us guessing.
Sources: Nukes of Hazard, The Economist, February 27, 2021.
Wikipedia.