Last February, Vladimir Putin, Russia’s President, sent a 200,000 man army across the border from Russia into the sovereign nation of Ukraine. He apparently believed that the Ukrainian forces would fall easily, as the size and strength of his invading force has proven to be inadequate for the job it was assigned to do. In the ensuing six months as many as 80,000 Russian troops have become casualties—either killed, wounded, or captured. That constitutes approximately forty percent of the invading force. In virtually any modern military parlance this would place the entire force’s status as “out of action.” The success of the Ukrainian forces has been remarkable, but can their momentum continue on to victory?
Ukrainian Counteroffensive: There have been numerous counter strokes made by the Ukrainian military since the war began, but the most impressive has been the one that began September 5th, that liberated the city of Kharkiv. The drive liberated some 6,000 square kilometers of occupied territory in a matter of days, causing many Russian troops to abandon tons of equipment as they fled the area. Further, the drive has recaptured two important transportation hubs, Izyum and Kupyansk, that Russia needs in its attempt to annex the Donbas region. The counteroffensive has not been limited to Donbas, but also includes most other occupied areas, especially Kherson to the south and west of Donbas. Using deception effectively, the Ukrainians made the object of the attack appear to Kharkiv when an even larger force turned up attacking in Kherson.
Weapons From the West: It’s true that a lot of their success has come courtesy of advanced Western made weapons that replaced much of the Ukraine military’s Warsaw Pact era weaponry. The artillery and rocket systems furnished by America in particular have been most useful and have drawn much attention in the media. But the mobile air defense systems deserve nearly as much credit as they have served to neutralize Russia’s superior air force by keeping it away from the action. Ukraine’s support from the west is on the increase, whereas Russia’s supply of weapons is dwindling, and faces problems with replenishment owing to Western sanctions on the Russian economy. As Russian troops retreat, they often leave large numbers of weapons and military vehicles behind along with tons of supplies and materiel that wound up being incorporated by the Ukrainians into their counter offensive.
Manpower Advantage: The massive number of Russian casualties has caused Vladimir Putin to call for additional manpower by way of conscription and bringing up reserves. The reaction by the Russian population has been to resist, mainly by military aged young men fleeing the country and seeking asylum elsewhere. The focus of the callup is centered on those young men who already have some military experience. Delays in replacing the casualties are cropping up as those without military experience that do enlist must be first discovered, recruited, and trained. The lack of training in the ranks of the invasion force has made itself readily apparent on the battlefield. In contrast, the morale among Ukrainian troops is very high. Several NATO countries, especially Britain, have conducted military training for Ukrainian troops. Their command structure is more streamlined than their adversary’s making it easier for battlefield commanders to make decisions. Most field-level decisions by the invasion force must be cleared through Moscow delaying and complicating any coordinated action by Russian forces.
Long Protracted War: The major successes by Ukrainian forces may have turned the tide in the war. But can these successes be kept up time and time again. There is still a long way to go with much occupied territory remaining in the Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson areas. Further, there is the large Crimean Peninsula that was annexed by Russia in 2014. Vladimir Putin has staked his political future on victory, seeking to bolster his image as a forever strong and victorious ruler. For this reason alone, it should mean that more Russian resources, including human ones, will be allocated to the war effort. The Ukrainians have demonstrated that they can act and react swiftly on the battlefield by striking in places where the Russians are not expecting them and are not prepared. These factors have the making of a long, protracted war.
Conclusions: The Russian population had been kept until recently under stifling control by Putin’s propaganda machine. But more and more criticism of the war effort has started to rise. The propaganda machine has been forced to compromise with its reporting of the army’s retreat by saying that the military was conducting “an operation to organize the transfer of troops.” The Russian population has a tendency to accept the propaganda as long as it stays in the news media and does not interfere with their personal lives. A major military mobilization and callup would change that perception and create much more resistance in the population.
Sources: The Economist, Getting the Job Done, September 17th, 2022.
The Economist, Chasing the Bear Away, September 17th, 2022.
The Economist, Setting Sun, September 17th, 2022.